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DOES SECURITY TRUMP TRADE?
Dunniela Kaufman *
HIS paper was written to facilitate a panel discussion under the
same title at the ABA's fall meeting 2006. It was a collaborative
work done by Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP's (FMC) international
trade group, as coordinated by Dunniela Kaufman.
I. SUMMARY
While security concerns have always been recognized as legitimate ar-
eas in which sovereign states, either unilaterally or in concert with other
states, may adopt measures or pursue goals that may run counter to trade
liberalization, the paradigm radically changed following the events of
September 11, 2001. Prior to September 11, trade liberalization and mul-
tinational cooperation were the driving objectives behind international
agreements affecting trade. While trade and security considerations were
very often linked in these agreements, trade remained the primary focus
of the agreements, and security considerations manifested themselves pri-
marily in the form of permitted derogations from the primary objective,
to liberalize trade.
Some of the developments of the past five years may have occurred
with or without September 11, as the natural result of a world in which
the interests of member states of international trade agreements are as
divergent as ever, and the trade disputes between these states are po-
larized as ever. But September 11 looms as the most significant cause of
the paradigm shift-in which the resources of key players such as the
United States have been focused on security-based initiatives, in which
trade liberalization and trade facilitation are secondary goals and many of
the specific features of these initiatives have the potential to impede
trade. Many argue that in this new era multilateralism and positive agen-
das have been replaced with regionalism, unilateralism, and reactive ap-
proaches to seeking solutions.
This paper will explore this paradigm shift, and its potential implica-
tions in the context of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP).
The SPP is a trilateral initiative that was launched in March 2005 by the
Dunniela is a senior associate in FMC's international trade group. As a member
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United States, Canada and Mexico to "increase security and enhance
prosperity . . . through greater cooperation and information sharing."'
We conclude that while the framers of the SPP have touted the initiative
as trade-enhancing and have claimed that it was not intended to supplant
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFFA), it has the poten-
tial to be more trade-restrictive than trade enhancing and a number of its
provisions have the potential to supplant similar NAFTA provisions.
A. SECURITY AND TRADE IN HISTORY
The link between trade and security has long been an issue of deep
socio-economic interest. For example, the colonial wars pursued by the
European powers in the nineteenth century were aimed at, inter alia, ex-
ploiting the gains from cross-border trade. A more concrete example is
the protectionist wave in the latter half of the nineteenth century. After a
period of enhanced trade relationships in the 1850s and 1860s, trade suf-
fered an abrupt reversal towards protectionism when Europe exper-
ienced dramatic recession as well as increased competition from non-
European grain producers. In 1879, Germany retreated from the princi-
ple of free trade as Bismarck decided to raise tariffs substantially in order
to preserve the economic security of the country. 2
In the North-American context, Canadian economic integration with
the United States can be traced back to 1854 when Canada and the
United States signed the Elgin-Marcy Reciprocity Agreement. This
Agreement secured trade for Canadian agricultural products and raw
materials into the U.S. market in exchange for U.S. access to fishing
rights. A more recent manifestation of the tension between trade and
security concerns is the imposition of embargoes, which are designed to
achieve political goals, and address what may be perceived as security
threats with an extra-territorial dimension. An example of such a govern-
ment measure is the U.S. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (better known as the Helms-Burton Act).3
The introduction of the Act was largely prompted by an event that hap-
pened on February 24, 1996, when Cuban fighter jets shot down two pri-
vate planes operated by a Miami based anti-Castro Cuban refugee
support group called Brothers to the Rescue (Hermanos al Rescate).
Governments and businesses in other countries argued that the Act ran
counter to the spirit of international law and sovereignty because it con-
tained provisions that sought to punish non-U.S. companies for engaging
in trade with Cuba. The extraterritorial aspect of this measure was con-
demned by the Council of Europe, the European Union, Canada, Mex-
ico, Argentina and other U.S. allies that enjoy normal trade relations with
1. SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA, http://www.spp.
gov (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
2. PAUL BAIROCH, European Trade Policy, 1815 - 1914, in 8 THE CAMBRIDGE ECO-
NOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 51-52 (Peter Mathias & Sidney Pollard eds., 1989).
3. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (2000).
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Cuba. The European Union even commenced a complaint with the
World Trade Organization. 4 Because the Helms-Burton Act had extra-
territorial implications for Canada, the Canadian Parliament enacted leg-
islation to counter the U.S. legislation, as it impeded or reduced trade or
commerce between Canada and Cuba.
5
From the end of World War II until the end of the Cold War, the world,
for the most part, was divided on the basis of ideological grounds. These
ideological grounds were premised on a distinction that at its heart was
economic. While trade between the separate and distinct blocs
progressed during this time period, it was not until the Cold War ended
that there appeared to be global consensus regarding the benefits of free
trade, which inherently require free market regulation.
After the end of the Cold War, and in view of the burgeoning techno-
logical advancement towards the end of the twentieth century, there was
general optimism that globalization, and correspondingly free trade,
would eventually cause borders between nations to become irrelevant.
But the events of Sept. 11, 2001, ushered in a new normal and the idea
that borders may one day become irrelevant now seemed a distant mem-
ory. North America was now focused on securing borders. As nations
grappled with a new sense of insecurity, the economic interdependence
created by successive free trade agreements had to find a way to survive.
In North America, finding a way to facilitate the free trade of goods and
services in the new normal has been made a priority from day one, albeit
always a subservient one. On December 12, 2001 Canada and the United
States signed the Smart Border Accord, which contained a thirty-point
plan aimed at ensuring security while simultaneously allowing for the free
trade of goods and services. 6 The Accord is an example of a reactive
measure prompted primarily by the culture of fear alluded to in the intro-
ductory part of this paper.
While the governments of Canada and the United States undertook
immediate efforts to ensure the border continued to function, a year after
these governments launched the Smart Border Accord, the private sector
called for further action. In January 2003, the Canadian Council of Chief
Executives (CCCE) published its North American Security and Prosper-
ity Initiative (NAPSI). 7 This initiative proposed a strategy with five ma-
4. The work of the dispute settlement panel was suspended to find a solution through
negotiations. After a year, the panel lost its jurisdiction over the matter, and the
EU did not pursue the matter anymore before the WTO.
5. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (Can. 1985).
6. Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terror-
ism/declaration-en.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
7. The Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE) is a not-for-profit, non-parti-
san organization composed of the CEOs of some of Canada's leading enterprises.
The CCCE engages in public policy research, consultation and advocacy on behalf
of its members. Security and Prosperity Toward a New Canada-United States
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jor elements, "[r]einventing borders, [m]aximizing regulatory efficiencies,
[n]egotiation of a comprehensive resource security pact, [r]einvigorating
the North American defence alliance [and] [c]reating a new institutional
framework ' 8 In setting out these major elements, the CCCE called on
the parties to the NAFTA "to create a zone of cooperation encompassing
the continent rather than focusing security efforts on the line that sepa-
rates us." 9
Two years after the CCCE published its NAPSI, in March 2005, the
NAFIA parties' launched the North American Security and Prosperity
Partnership. 10 The SPP was designed to establish and develop a coopera-
tive approach to advancing common security and prosperity and to en-
sure that these seemingly opposed objectives become mutually
reinforcing. To that end, the SPP provides a mechanism to advance col-
laboration in the areas of security, trade facilitation, transportation, envi-
ronment and public health. Contrary to the calls by the CCCE, the SPP
does not create a new institutional arrangement. In fact, it is neither an
international agreement nor a treaty. It is merely a framework for dia-
logue. As a flexible arrangement that attempts to develop a collaborative
approach, the SPP allows for bilateral discussions and initiatives, presum-
ably to address the distinctions in pressing matters that arise bilaterally
between the trilateral group.
It is generally understood by the private sector that they need to con-
tinue to work with government in a coordinated fashion to identify, de-
velop and implement policies that support important security measures
while simultaneously ensuring economic growth and global opportunities.
In forcing governments to focus on the functioning of their borders, some
have suggested that the result is actually more effective processes; thus
the question becomes, does security trump trade in the twenty-first Cen-
tury, or does it actually facilitate it?
B. THE MAIN THESIS
The concept of security lends itself to a two-faceted analysis. From a
broader perspective, security is to be pursued on a global scale. In this
sense of the term, protected borders is not necessarily synonymous with a
secure country since security threats do not recognize national borders.
In other words, border security does not ineluctably translate into socio-
economic security. A terrorist attack in Nigeria or a geopolitical crisis
concerning Iran may lead to convulsions in the oil and stock markets
across the world.
8. Canadian Council of Chief Executives, North American Security and Prosperity,
http://www.ceocouncil.ca/en/north/north.php (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
9. Canadian Council of Chief Executives: Reinventing Borders, http://64.26.159.96/
en/north/reinventing.php (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
10. Press Release, Joint Statement by President Bush, President Fox, and Prime Minis-
ter Martin (Mar. 23, 2005) (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/2005
0323-2.html).
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In its more limited form, security is canvassed merely as border secur-
ity. When viewed as such, the tension between security measures and
trade flows is apparent. The very idea of trade regulation is premised on
the alleviation or removal of obstacles to the flow of goods and people
across a sovereign nation's borders. Conversely, the goal of border secur-
ity measures is to create border screening mechanisms designed to pre-
vent certain categories of people and goods from entry. Such
mechanisms are intrinsically liable to impose another obstacle to trade
along with the traditional protectionist driven forms of restrictions such
as tariffs and quotas. This presentation will endeavour to inquire into the
practical dimensions of this prima facie theoretical discrepancy.
On their face, the SPP statements and policy documents claim that
there is no readily discernible conflict between the overarching goals of
achieving security and enhancing trade. For example, it is assumed that
regulatory compatibility leads to safer and faster trade, and that "border
strategy... results in the fast, efficient and secure movement of low-risk
trade and travelers to and within North America.""1 The question, how-
ever, is, how will this rhetoric be implemented in practice? For instance,
what would be the extent of the regulatory cooperation and is it going to
lead to more costly regulatory burdens on exporters? How will the term
trusted/legitimate travellers be defined and will it exclude a portion of
legitimate travellers due to inadequate procedures? What is the degree
of border congestion that would be precipitated by the SPP security mea-
sures? These questions can only be answered after thorough observation
of the next steps under the SPP.
In the context of the new SPP, the geopolitical issue with perhaps the
most significant implications for the future of North America is the rela-
tionship between the Partnership and the NAFTA within the framework
for trilateral co-operation. The NAFTA and the SPP represent the two
visions for economic integration introduced in the opening remarks of the
paper. The NAFTA embodies the proactive approach towards trade lib-
eralization, whereas the SPP is an attempt to reconcile the positive goal
of integration with the reactive objective of responding to the perils of
terrorism.
At present, the SPP has gained the political momentum to be the major
vehicle for North-American integration, thereby calling into question the
relevance of the NAFTA. This phenomenon is occurring at a time when
the NAFFA, and most specifically its dispute mechanism, has come into
question, especially in light of the softwood dispute. While the leaders of
Canada, United States and Mexico claim that the SPP does not seek to
rewrite or renegotiate the NAFTA and creates no NAFTA-plus legal sta-
tus, given some of its areas of focus, such as standards and rules of origin,
it remains to be seen if this initiative will bleed resources and energy from
an institution desperately in need of the same. Given the importance of
11. Press Release, Leaders' Joint Statement (Mar. 31, 2006) (http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/
media.asp?id=1085).
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the relationship between the NAFTA and the SPP, the analysis that fol-
lows examines the principal distinctions and overlays between the two
frameworks.
II. POST-NAFTA INTEGRATION: THE CONCEPT
OF BORDERS AND THE SPP
A. THE CONCEPT OF BORDERS
1. General
Ever since their inception, modern states have described themselves as
sovereign spatial entities which exercise jurisdiction within the bounda-
ries of their territory. Borders are the ultimate manifestation of their sov-
ereignty. "Sovereignty, though its meanings have varied across
history, .... has a core meaning, supreme authority within a territory. It is
a modern notion of political authority. 1 2
The philosophy of economic integration through cross-border trade is a
contrasting paradigm to the concept of borders in that it undercuts the
sovereignty of the nation state, or at least its economic incarnation. The
general role of states weakens as they increasingly participate in various
international institutions and regimes, such as the EU, the WTO, the
GATT, and the NAFTA, which in turn ineluctably attenuates their regu-
latory power. Incontrovertibly, this is one of the fundamental features of
the contemporary process of global integration. 'One of the central as-
pects of the "strong" globalization thesis is the argument that States are
no longer autonomous actors.' 1 3 In other words, the decline of the signif-
icance of the nation-state and the internalization of governance constitute
key characteristics of globalization.
2. Reinventing the North American Concept of Borders
In the North-American context, there appears to be emerging a new
realm of sovereignty: North American security sovereignty. It is embod-
ied in the idea of reinventing North-American borders by eliminating as
many barriers as possible to the movement of people and goods across
the internal border and by shifting the emphasis to protection of the ap-
proaches to North America. 14 This will be achieved, for instance, by im-
plementing compatible border security measures and real-time
information sharing among the North American partners so that they can
better screen out high-risk individuals and cargo before they depart for
North America. "The SPP's security track seeks, through bilateral and
trilateral cooperation, to secure North America from external threats
12. Dan Philpott, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta
ed. 2003), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2OO3/entries/sover-
eignty/.
13. Tim Dunne, Perspectives on Globalization from Developing States, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 17, 28 (1999).
14. See Security and Prosperity: Toward a New Canada-U.S. Partnership in North
America, supra note 7.
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through improved intelligence sharing, infrastructure protection, border
management, and traveler and cargo security."' 15 Thus in securing a
North American perimeter, the politicians have managed to further a
specific agenda without having to address the dialogue that normally ac-
companies efficiency driven policies that ultimately lead to continental
integration.
3. Security of Borders: Flow of Persons and Goods
In the pursuit of border security thus far, Canada, United States, and
Mexico have resorted to a series of incremental initiatives, rather than
wide-sweeping perimeter security projects. Such efforts include both Ca-
nadian structural transformations as well as coordinated efforts such as
the Smart Border Accord and its supportive Action Plan. The original
Action Plan contained thirty points, but in December 2002, the scope of
the plan was expanded to include two more points: science and technol-
ogy and biosecurity. t6 The plan was devised to achieve the following
objectives:
(i) The secure flow of people;
(ii) The secure flow of goods;
(iii) Investing in infrastructure; and,
(iv) Coordination and information sharing in enforcement of these
aforementioned objectives.' 7
Two of these four pillars, namely the flow of goods and the flow of
people, will serve as the basis for the discussion that follows respecting
the implications of the SPP for the functioning of the North American
borders.
B. THE SECURE FLOW OF GOODS
The rapid and assured transit of cross-border goods is a major eco-
nomic priority for North American trade partners due to the enormous
volume of trade that flows between them, in particular between Canada
and the United States. The smooth functioning of border crossings is es-
sential to facilitating the continuance of that flow. Following the events
of September 11, the increased focus on security concerns inherent in the
new norm led both Canada and the United States to revamp their cus-
toms -procedures, re-align their customs administration and implement
new means to ensure that low risk commercial goods would continue to
flow unencumbered across the border. For the most part, Canada emu-
lated the United States in re-aligning their executive prerogatives to ad-
15. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Security and Prosperity
Partnership of North America Security Agenda (Mar. 23, 2005) (http://www.spp.
gov/security agenda/index.asp?dName=security-agenda).
16. Press Release, Public Safety Canada, McLellan and Ridge Highlight Progress on
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dress the new norm and embarked on targeted initiatives aimed at
ensuring that the northern border remained open for business. Some of
the U.S. and Canadian trade and security initiatives include Partners in
Protection (PIP), Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT), Advance Commercial Information (ACI), Free and Secure Trade
(FAST), and Customs Self Assessment (CSA). Another good example is
the fact that both Canada and U.S. Customs have new specific jurisdic-
tion and new names that include security.
1. Trade Liberalization v. Security Compliance Costs
The rationale behind the NAFTA and trade in general is liberalization
rather than regulation. Its objective is to "eliminate barriers to trade in,
and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services between
the territories of the Parties." 18 The fundamental proposition of the
trade doctrine is that goods should be able to cross borders at a tariff-
free, competitive price, which in turn would enhance the efficiency and
competitiveness of the international market for such products.
On the other hand, security concerns have propelled a move towards
more regulation, in this case border regulation. Such regulatory stan-
dards would necessarily impose compliance costs on exporters and im-
porters. Generally, harmonization can be propitious for international
trade (e.g. the Harmonized Tariff Schedule). But standards harmoniza-
tion as envisioned by the SPP may impose trade regulatory costs. For
example, increased transit times brought about by lengthy border screen-
ing measures may increase shipping costs. One such measure may be the
U.S.-Canada Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway Enforcement Program,
where both governments have pledged to develop coordinated maritime
law enforcement against smuggling and trafficking. Further, the adoption
of technical standards for imported products, albeit in a harmonized
form, may engender greater compliance costs. Additional costs could in-
clude driver costs (e.g., compensation and certification), investments in
security installations and information systems, and the additional admin-
istrative expenses associated with the added paperwork and electronic
filing.
To date, only the compliance costs imposed subsequent to the Smart
Border Accord have been measured comprehensively. For example, the
annual costs incurred by the Canadian trucking industry as a result of
U.S. security measures, such as Customs-Trade Partnership Against Ter-
rorism (C-TPAT), Free and Secure Trade (FAST) and the Advanced
Electronic Presentation of Cargo Information under the U.S. Trade Act,
are in the order of $290 million per year. 19
18. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 102(1)(a), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
19. Impact of U.S. Import Compliance Programs at the Canada/U.S. Land Border on
the Canadian Trucking Industry, http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/report/BorderStudy/Ex
Sum.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
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With respect to the measures taken under the SPP, compliance costs
can be fully gauged in terms of their impact on trade only after the first
collaborative efforts planned under the SPP have been materialized. The
current status of the process is described in the Ministers' Report to
Leaders on Security and Prosperity Partnership Initiatives from Septem-
ber 7, 2006.20 According to the report, officials from the regulatory,
trade, and oversight agencies of all three countries met for the first time
on April 18-19, 2006. The three countries discussed their respective regu-
latory systems and highlighted areas of cooperation. As a result, the
three countries identified a core set of elements for the regulatory coop-
eration framework to include coordinating joint work on regulatory
processes, promoting best practices, and enhancing information sharing
throughout the regulatory process.
The increase in cross-border costs may result not only from the regula-
tory compliance burden, but from directly imposed entry fees adopted as
a funding mechanism for security measures. The imposition of such entry
fees has been announced, for instance, by the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture, which has served notice of emergency action funded with per trip
surcharges that take effect on November 24, 2006.21 The entry fee will
range from $5 per air passenger to $488 for a maritime vessel, with trucks
paying $5.25 and railways $7.50 per car.22 The funding raised will be used
for an expanded agriculture inspection program to screen air travellers
and commercial rail, truck, ship and plane deliveries for biohazards. 23
2. The Benefits of the SPP for Trade
Some of the accomplishments under the SPP agenda may have a propi-
tious effect on the flow of goods by lowering transportation costs and
creating greater efficiencies. Examples of such measures undertaken
under the auspices of the SPP include the following:
" The United States and-Canada intend to complete a border infra-
structure compendium and develop an implementation plan for pri-
ority infrastructure investments at key land border ports of entry,
improve border trade and traffic information, enhance use of sup-
porting technologies and improve border transportation planning
and coordination.
" The United States and Canada reached a full Open-Skies Aviation
Agreement, removing all economic restrictions on air service to,
from, and beyond one another's territory by the airlines of both
20. News Release, CCN Mathews, Ministers Report to Leaders on Security and Prop-
erty Partnership Initiatives (Sept. 7, 2006) (http://www.ccnmatthews.com/news/re-
leases/show.jsp?action=showrelease&actionFor=611059dsearchText=false&show
Text=allb) [hereinafter Minister's Report].
21. Steven Chase, Business Leaders Urge a Fight Against New U.S. Border Rules, Fees,
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countries. The Agreement will encourage new markets develop-
ment, lower prices and greater competition. The Agreement was ini-
tialled in November 2005, and is expected to take effect in
September 2006.24
" To promote prosperity by reducing the costs of trade, the United
States and Canada decreased transit times at the Detroit/Windsor
gateway, our largest border crossing point, by 50 percent.2 5 Further-
more, on September 6, 2006, "[T]he governments of Canada and On-
tario announced the start of a foundations investigations study that
will lead to a better understanding of the bedrock stability in areas
where a new international bridge spanning the Detroit River could
be located. ' 2 6
* To support increased trade and expedite secure processing of cross-
border trade and travel between Mexico and the United States, six
FAST (Free and Secure Trade)/Express lanes are operating at the
U.S.-Mexico border, a new lane in Nogales will open soon, and we
are working on a project for a lane in Matamoros. Exclusive lines
and schedules will be implemented at nine crossings.27
" There is a plan to build a vast NAFTA Super Highway, through the
heart of the U.S. along Interstate 35, from the Mexican border at
Laredo, Texas, to the Canadian border north of Duluth, Minnesota.
C. THE SECURE FLOW OF PEOPLE
It is important to note that the SPP regards security as a means to an
end. The ultimate objective, at least in so far as illustrated by the political
language of the document, is the prosperous development of North
America.28 The aim of the initiative is to empower the people living in
North America, through enhanced higher education, academic ex-
changes, and common research and development initiatives, to better
prepare for the future. 29 In order to work towards this common goal, the
people of North America require the ability to move between borders.
24. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, The Security and Pros-
perity Partnership of North America: Next Steps (Mar. 31, 2006) (http://www.state.
gov/p/wha/rls/prsrl/2006/ql/69852.htm) [hereinafter Next Steps].
25. Id.
26. Press Release, Communiqu6, Canada and Ontario Begin Foundations Investiga-
tion Study for New Windsor-Detroit International Crossing (Sept. 6, 2006) (http://
www.partnershipborderstudy.com/pdf/060906_FoundationsInvestigationsPress
Release-English.pdf).
27. Next Steps, supra note 24.
28. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, International Informa-
tion Programs, North American Prosperity Depends on Security, (Mar. 23, 2005)
(http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/mar/23-12996.html).
29. Press Release, SPP.Gov, Report to Leaders, Security and Prosperity Partnership
of North America: Report to Leaders (June 27, 2005) (http://www.spp.gov/report-
toleaders/index.asp?dName=report-tojleaders) [hereinafter Report to Leaders].
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1. Legitimate v. Illegitimate Travel: Practical Difficulties in Establishing
a Clear Demarcation Between the Two
The prevalent language employed by the SPP with respect to the move-
ment of people reveals two interrelated goals-to facilitate the travel of
low-risk, legitimate, trusted travellers, and to prevent high-risk travellers
from taking advantage of the existing opportunities for cross-border
movement. To this end, by way of example, the SPP contemplates pro-
grams to substantially reduce transit times and border congestion, such as
partnering with state, provincial and local governments and the private
sector to establish low-risk port of entry pilots for the exclusive use of
those enrolled in the trusted trade and traveler programs. Another ex-
ample is the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative's goal to enhance
screening of travelers into the U.S. and to facilitate low-risk traffic. The
three partners of the SPP have agreed to create a single, integrated pro-
gram for North American trusted travelers by 2008; officials are currently
developing security standards for travel documents. 30 Individuals apply-
ing for trusted traveler status would be able to apply for the program and
pay relevant fees in one transaction. Enrolled participants would have
access to all established trusted travel lanes at land crossings, airports and
marine programs.
To date, there has not been formulated a uniform, comprehensive defi-
nition of legitimate or trusted travel. The real impact of the SPP trusted
travelers programs on trade will depend on a multitude of aspects: will
the scope of legitimate travellers be delineated in such a restrictive way as
to potentially exclude persons involved in valid cross-border trade enter-
prises? What body/institution will be given the authority to decide who
will be granted access to the legitimate travel program? How will the
program be executed at the border technologically?
The NAFITA also recognizes the importance of border security in the
context of the movement of people. Article 1601, which sets out the gen-
eral principles for the chapter on the temporary entry of business per-
sons, reflects the need to ensure border security. Further, article 1603
requires each party to the NAFTA to grant temporary entry to business
persons, who are otherwise qualified for entry under applicable measures
relating to public health and safety and national security. But the
NAFTA stops short of defining these applicable measures. It employs
different terminology-it refers to the general category of BUSINESS PER-
SON (a citizen of a party who is engaged in trade in goods, the provision
of services or the conduct of investment activities). The SPP, in contrast,
goes one step further in that it attempts to merge the goals of the move-
ment of people and national security. It views these two goals in-
separably, as inextricably linked components of the same objective.
30. Ministers' Report, supra note 20.
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2. Mexican v. Canadian Border: Different Security Concerns
One of the potential perils of the SPP border strategy is that it fuses
two distinct efforts for enhancing border security-one related to the
U.S.-Mexico border and the other to the U.S.-Canada border. The two
are characterized by problems of dissimilar nature, and thus they may not
be amenable to a singular solution. Accordingly, the SPP's attempt to
resolve both within the same framework is inherently laden with diffi-
culty. To this end, the Partnership stipulates different approaches to the
concerns relating to the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada. On the
one hand, U.S. security concerns arising from the relationship with Mex-
ico fall predominantly within the objective of promoting the border se-
curity between the two countries. Some examples of cooperative
measures to this end within the SPP framework are the following:
" To increase border security, Mexican and U.S. agencies are harmo-
nizing risk assessment mechanisms, exchanging information, and es-
tablishing protocols to facilitate detection of fraud and smuggling.31
" To address border violence, the United States and Mexico signed an
Action Plan to Combat Border Violence and Improve Public Safety.
Officials of the two countries in Nogales, AZ, Nogales, Sonora and
Laredo, TX, Nuevo Laredo completed protocols on border security
and public safety. 32
" Under the United States-Mexico Voluntary Repatriation Program,
more than 35,000 persons, including 20,500 in 2005, were returned to
their home in a secure, legal, and humanitarian way. 33
" With the goal of enhancing public safety along the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der, the United States and Mexico agreed to establish a standardized
Alien Smuggler Prosecution Programs along the Southeast border.34
" New secure SENTRI travel lanes will be constructed by 2006, and
the United States and Mexico will work toward implementation of a
secure cross-border commuter service between El Paso and Ciudad
Juirez. 35
The goal of the border security measures that the SPP provides for in
respect of the U.S.-Mexico border is the prevention of the illegal cross-
border flow of people prompted by the migratory pressures of the eco-
nomic conditions as between the two countries. These migratory pres-
sures are further propelled by the increasing numbers of undocumented
migrants from countries other than Mexico who use that country as a
transit point to the United States. Individuals from more than sixty coun-
tries are typically held in Mexico City's migrant detention centre on any
given day, and the arrest rate along the U.S.-Mexico border of what the
Border Patrol calls "Other than Mexicans" has increased in recent years.
31. Next Steps, supra note 24.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Report to Leaders, supra note 29.
35. Id.
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While most of these individuals are jobseekers from Latin America,
others come from countries that may be of concern to U.S. national se-
curity interests. 3
6
Ultimately, the SPP does not address the root cause of the undocu-
mented migration between the United States and Mexico, and as such is
not capable of securing the border against such migratory movement.
Real security and prosperity for all three NAFTA partners requires incor-
porating an agreement on labour migration into the project of North
American economic integration. The process of North American integra-
tion has created the structural conditions that spur migration. This asser-
tion follows from the principle that when weak economies are exposed to
vast competitive pressures generated by liberalized trade and the free
flow of goods and services, they in turn tend to cause pressures for migra-
tion themselves. In the specific context of the NAFTA, this paradigm is
exemplified by the uneven effects of the NAFTA on the Mexican eco-
nomic demographics, particularly in rural areas and marginalized groups
that tend to migrate to the United States.37 Overall, since the NAFTA
was signed, the wage disparity in Mexico has worsened. 38 Since the in-
ception of the NAFI'A, the rural poverty rate in Mexico has risen and
real manufacturing wages are almost 11 percent lower than when the
agreement came into effect.39
Neither the NAFTA, nor the new SPP, address the need for a more
integrated continental regulation of labour migration. The NAFTA's at-
tempt at such regulation consisted mainly of the adoption of the North
American Agreement on Labour Cooperation, whose principal objective
is to improve the working conditions and living standards in each Party's
territory. Similarly, the measures which have been and will be under-
taken pursuant to the SPP are confined to the border ramifications of the
migratory pressures and are not directed at the reasons for these pres-
sures. As a consequence, it is highly implausible that the Partnership, at
least in its present form, will provide a long-term solution to the U.S.-
Mexico border security concerns.
On the other hand, in respect of its border with Canada, the United
States has placed the emphasis on what categories of people Canada ad-
mits from outside of North America, rather than on specific border mea-
sures designed to manage the cross-border movement of people between
the two countries. This goal has been pursued by collaborative efforts
36. See Michael Flynn, Who's Trying to Cross Our Southern Border? Everyone, WASH-
INGTON POST, Dec. 11, 2005, at B1.
37. ROBERT A. PASTOR, TOWARD A NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY: LESSONS FROM
THE OLD WORLD FOR THE NEW (Washington, DC: Institute for International Eco-
nomics 2001).
38. Gordon H. Hanson, What Has Happened to Wages in Mexico since NAFTA? 26-27
(Cambridge, MA: Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9563,
March 2003).
39. J. Enrique Espinosa, et al., Happily Ever NAFTA?, FOREIGN POLICY, September/
October 2002 at 2.
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directed at harmonizing the treatment of non-North American aliens by
the two countries:
* To strengthen the integrity and security of asylum and refugee status
determination systems, the United States and Canada launched a pi-
lot project to share information on refugee and asylum claimants
based on a comparison of fingerprint records. 40
" Refugee/Asylum Processing: to review refugee/asylum practices and
procedures to ensure that applicants are thoroughly screened for se-
curity risks and take necessary steps to share information on refugee
and asylum claimants.4
1
" To negotiate a safe third-country agreement to enhance the manag-
ing of refugee claims (see more on that).
" Visa policy coordination: to initiate joint review of respective waiver
lists and share look-out lists at visa issuing offices. 42
This political pattern is similar to the development of the EU regula-
tory framework for immigration and asylum issues, particularly after the
legislative reforms in 1999 according to which the domain of immigration
and asylum became a Community responsibility as opposed to an inter-
governmental matter.4 3 But given the level of integration within the EU,
such harmonized immigration and asylum policy appears to be a natural
corollary to the economic unification of the Union. In contrast, the
North-American political landscape does not evince such deep economic
and political integration. In this respect, it can be argued that the SPP
and the Action Plan attach an additional, political dimension to the eco-
nomic cooperation spurred by the NAFTA.
III. REGULATORY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NAFTA
AND THE SPP: NAFTA-PLUS STATUS?
A. REGULATION OF SECURITY BY THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIME
Both the NAFTA and the GATT contain provisions for the availability
of trade-restrictive government measures imposed on national security
grounds. Under both treaties, states are permitted to adopt or enforce
measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. 44
Further, Article 2102 of the NAFTA provides:
40. Next Steps, supra note 24.
41. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-Canada Smart
Border/30 Point Action Plan' Update .(Dec. 6, 2002) (http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/12/print/200212061.html).
42. Id.
43. See Council Directive 2003/86/EC, 2003 O.J. (L251) 12 (on the right to family
reunification); Council Directive 2005/85/EC, 2005 O.J.,(L236) 13 (on minimum
standards on procedures in member states for granting and withdrawing refugee
status); Council Directive 2003/109/EC, 2004 O.J. (L16) 44 (concerning the status
of third country nationals who are long-term residents).
44. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts. 20, 154, Jan. 1, 1948, 55
U.N.T.S.; NAFJA, supra note 18, art. 2101.
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1. Subject to Articles 607 (Energy - National Security Measures) and
1018 (Government Procurement - Exceptions), nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require any Party to furnish or allow access to any information
the disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential
security interests;
(b) to prevent any Party from taking any actions that it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war and to such traffic and transactions in other goods, materi-
als, services and technology undertaken directly or indirectly for
the purpose of supplying a military or other security
establishment,
(ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international re-
lations, or
(iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or inter-
national agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or
(c) to prevent any Party from taking action in pursuance of its obli-
gations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.45
But security justifications cannot be used as disguised restriction on
international trade.
In view of the above provisions, it can be discerned that the NAFTA
views national security as an exception to its regulatory scope. In other
words, national security does not form a focal point of governance under
the Agreement. Given this limited ambit of security-related provisions in
the NAFrA, it should not come as a surprise that in a post-September 11
world, security issues, which have taken on a new magnitude, had to be
addressed outside of the NAFTA. In the SPP, the 'exception' relating to
national security has become the dominant consideration. This signifies
the critical shift in focus in the process of North-American integration
and highlights once again the proactive-reactive dichotomy elucidated
above.
B. THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS
The initial philosophy of the NAFTA was not only to create a regime
governing the trade relationship between the parties, but also to "estab-
lish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral coopera-
tion to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement. '46 Still, the
parties did not resort to the existing framework in negotiating the terms
of the SPP, which inherently has trade implications and specifically ad-
dresses matters under the purview of the NAFTA.
In view of the outstanding trade issues plaguing the North American
trade bloc, for example the issue relating to softwood lumber, it would be
45. NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 2102.
46. NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 102(1)(f).
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logical to expect that any further negotiations between the NAFTA par-
ties would aim to address those issues. Given the impetus for an inte-
grated hemispheric trading regime, it is incumbent that these parties, as a
dominant weight in the hemisphere, deal with the underlying issues and
inequities that exist in the current regime. While the increasing economic
integration as a result of the NAFTA poses growing challenges to Mexico
and Canada in light of U.S. security concerns, this need not be the case.
Border security can, in effect, give added leverage to negotiate reforms in
U.S. policies long resistant to change. Still, the new SPP does not endeav-
our to tackle these issues. They are being dealt with outside of the part-
nership. For example, the United States and Canada are in the process of
entering a softwood lumber agreement, and the legal text was signed by
Canadian international trade minister David Emerson and United States
trade Representative Susan Schwab on September 13, 2006 in Ottawa.
It is difficult to conclude that the NAFTA negotiation framework is not
an appropriate forum for pursuing a competitive North-American market
environment, yet the current legislators seem to be pulling away from this
established forum as a mechanism to create a global trading bloc to face
regional competitive strength. In fact, the very impetus for signing the
agreement was economic growth and increased investment opportunities.
It is unsustainable to maintain that there is distinction between these
objectives and the pursuit of competitiveness.
This compartmentalization of the SPP, without its integration within
the legal and institutional framework of the NAFTA, has the potential of
rendering the NAFTA useless. This is increasingly important since the
NAFIA, while providing for preferential tariffs and access, also affords a
great deal of protection against trade remedies. In the face of U.S. secur-
ity concerns, the existing degree of North American integration has ren-
dered discussions of whether or not further integration should take place
moot. The subordination of notions of prosperity, without effectively ad-
dressing the underlying issues that loom over our trading relationship,
poses an inherent danger to the North American trading regime. Ca-
nada's experiences with the NAFTA to date are indicative of this danger.
C. THE SPP AND THE NAFTA: COMMONALITY OF ISSUES
1. Rules of Origin
The Rules of Origin are an essential part of the NAFIA as they govern
the qualification of goods for duty-free treatment under the agreement.
Chapter four of the NAFTA contains a comprehensive regime for the
rules of origin applicable to the cross-border flow of goods within the
North-American market. Notwithstanding this clear mandate conferred
upon the NAFIA framework, the SPP agenda includes, as one of its pri-
mary objectives, the liberalization of the rules of origin.47 According to
the Report, the work under the auspices of the SPP is intended to com-
47. Report to Leaders, supra note 29.
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plete the modifications of the rules of origin, covering such goods as
household appliances, precious metals, and various machinery and equip-
ment parts. These changes will affect U.S. $ 20 billion of annual trilateral
trade. The logical question then arises as to why the Rules of Origin are
dealt with under the auspices of the SPP since the governing treaty in this
regard is the NAFTA. Is this a concealed attempt by the United States to
redesign the trade framework under the NAFTA by placing trade issues
on a completely different platform?
2. Compatibility of Regulations and Standards
Regulatory cooperation is one of the main themes underpinning the
SPP. The goal is to attain compatibility of standards-related measures re-
specting products. For example, such cooperation is envisaged with re-
spect to the public health and safety protection related to consumer
products, as well as textiles and apparel labelling. To ensure food safety
while facilitating trade, a Food Safety Coordinating Task Force was
formed with the mandate of developing a list of standards to compare for
similarities, differences and scientific bases for the differences. 48
On the other hand, the NAFTA contains similar provisions. Article
906, Compatibility and Equivalence, provides the following:
1. Recognizing the crucial role of standards-related measures in
achieving legitimate objectives, the Parties shall, in accordance with
this Chapter, work jointly to enhance the level of safety and of pro-
tection of human, animal and plant life and health, the environment
and consumers.
2. Without reducing the level of safety or of protection of human,
animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers, with-
out prejudice to the rights of any Party under this Chapter, and tak-
ing into account international standardization activities, the Parties
shall, to the greatest extent practicable, make compatible their re-
spective standards-related measures, so as to facilitate trade in a
good or service between the Parties.49
Upon reading of the two documents (SPP and NAFTA) together, there
seems to be a significant overlay of purpose and methodology in respect
of the adoption of uniform standards-related measures. This, in turn,
poses the question as to why regulatory cooperation comes under the um-
brella of the SPP, since its natural placement is within the purview of the
NAFTA. The difference is merely in the acuteness of the language,
rather than one of semantics. The NAFTA uses the term safety whereas
the SPP is concerned with security. The question is even more justified
having regard to the already existing Committee on Standards-Related
Measures under the NAFTA. One of the Committee's main functions is
to facilitate the process by which the Parties make compatible their stan-
48. Next Steps, supra note 24.
49. NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 906.
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dards-related measures.5 0
D. SPP AND TRADE-RELATED BUDGETARY COMMITMENTS
The significance of the SPP in the context of North-American integra-
tion can be measured by another determinant-the amount of budgetary
funds committed to it. For example, the most recent Canadian Federal
Budget pledged Canadian $303 million over two years to further the SPP
initiative of promoting the movement of low-risk trade and travellers
within North America. This strategy includes the following key activities,
as well as other efforts related to emerging SPP priorities:
" Enhancing Cargo Security and Expediting Processing at the Border;
" Better technology to Identify High-Risk Travellers and Better Proce-
dures to Expedite Low-Risk Travellers;
" Working with Partners to Assess and Respond to Threats.5 1
To provide a context for this budgetary figure, this Canadian $303 mil-
lion represents more than 20 percent of the total allocation for security,
which includes a wide range of programs such as "Cracking Down on
Crime" (the allocation for which is less than Canadian $303 million),
"Pandemic Preparedness", and "Strengthening Canada's Role in the
World."'52 By comparison, the 2005 Budget provided $433 million over
five years to further strengthen the capacity of the Canadian Government
to deliver secure and efficient border services. 53
The 2006 federal budget also allocated the following amounts to trade-
related programs:
" Canadian $172 million over two years to harmonize security regula-
tions for cargo in all modes of transportation.
" Canadian $26 million over two years to design and pilot an air cargo
security initiative.
* Canadian $5 million over two years to support Canada Border Ser-
vice Agency's Partners in Protection Program to explore greater
links with the U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
Program.
" Canadian $26 million over two years to enhance the capacity to cope
with high-risk situations at the border through joint training exer-
cises with the U.S.
" Canadian $1 million per year for a Canada-U.S. joint vulnerability
assessment program. Canadian $101 million to arm Canadian border
officers and provide necessary training.5 4
50. NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 913(2)(b).
51. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, CANADA, THE BUDGET PLAN 132-33 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter BUDGET 2006].
52. Id. at 126-27.
53. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, CANADA, THE BUDGET PLAN 227 (2005).
54. BUDGET 2006, supra note 52, at 126-133.
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" Canadian $2.4 billion over the next five years for new highways and
border infrastructure55
" Canadian $591 million over the next eight years in Canada's Pacific
Gateway 56
For the most part, all trade-focused budgetary allocations appear in the
section under the heading "Security."
E. THE MANAGEMENT OF TRADE DISPUTES
Issues pertaining to trade disputes were expressly omitted from the
SPP. The parties instead agreed to address matters pertaining to trade
disputes through existing treaties, namely the NAF-TA.57 By not ex-
pressly including a dispute resolution mechanism, or referencing an ex-
isting one, the obligations of the SPP will not be susceptible to challenge;
only its effect on entrenched obligations will be. While the lack of a dis-
pute mechanism substantiates the claim that the SPP is merely a frame-
work, one must question if the establishment of such a framework further
degrades the existing dispute settlement process, which has come into
question due to its inability to resolve the Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber
dispute.
F. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR WITHIN THE SPP
MODEL: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS COUNCIL
Article 2001 of the NAFTA establishes a Free Trade Commission,
which is charged with supervising the implementation of the Agreement
and overseeing its further elaboration. 58 The Commission is comprised of
cabinet-level representatives of the parties or their designees. In actual-
ity, the Commission has amounted to nothing more than a periodic gath-
ering of trade ministers.5 9 There is no provision .for the formal
participation of the private sector in the trilateral relationship among the
NAFTA parties.
The SPP, on the other hand, officially institutionalizes the input and
involvement of private business in the trilateral negotiation process
among the Partners to the SPP. This was achieved through the establish-
ment of the North American Competitiveness Council (NACC). The
driving force behind the creation of the NACC is the notion that adding
high-level business input and increasing private sector engagement in the
SPP will assist governments in enhancing North America's competitive
position. To this end, the NACC is endowed with the responsibility to:
55. Id. at 118.
56. Id.
57. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Security
and Prosperity Partnership of North America (Mar. 23, 2005) (http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050323-4.html).
58. NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 2001.
59. See Press Release, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, NAFTA Free
Trade Commission Joint Statement (July 16, 2004) (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/
nafta-alena/JS-SanAntonio-en.asp).
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" Consider issues that could be addressed trilaterally or bilaterally, as
improvements in our bilateral relationships enhance North Ameri-
can competitiveness.
* Address issues of immediate importance and provide strategic me-
dium and long-term advice.
" Provide input on the compatibility of our security and prosperity
agendas, given the linkages between security and prosperity in a
global marketplace.
* Offer ideas on the private sector's role in promoting North Ameri-
can competitiveness.60
At the Cancun press conference on March 31, 2006, Canada's Prime
Minister, Stephen Harper confirmed that the decision had been reached
to advance SPP by forming the NACC:
During my meetings with Presidents Bush and Fox, we reviewed the
progress of our Security and Prosperity Partnership, which provides
a framework to advance the common interests in the areas of secur-
ity, prosperity, and quality of life. We committed to further engage
the private sector. We've agreed to set up a North American Com-
petitiveness Council, made up of business leaders from all three
countries, to advise us on ways to improve the competitiveness of
our economies. They will meet with our ministers, identify priorities,
and make sure we follow up and implement them. 6t
Thus far, there has not been officially published information respecting
the membership requirements, the selection process, or the terms of the
members appointed to the NACC. There exists no charter for the NACC,
nor any specific delineation of roles and responsibilities. Further, there is
no reporting authority or mechanism. Still, according to the official rhet-
oric, the NACC is "an umbrella organization within the SPP" and "noth-
ing like the NACC had ever before been created in the NAFTA. '62
More information about the Council became available after its first,
and thus far only, meeting, which took place on June 15, 2006. The mem-
bers of the U.S. section of the North American Competitiveness Council
(NACC) are Campbell Soup Company, Chevron, Ford, FedEx, General
Electric, General Motors, Kansas City Southern Industries, Lockheed
Martin Corporation, Merck; Mittal Steel USA, New York Life; United
Parcel Service, Wal-Mart, and Whirlpool. 63 On the Canadian side of the
Council are companies such as Manulife Financial, Power Corporation of
60. Next Steps, supra note 24.
61. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush, Presi-
dent Fox of Mexico, and Prime Minster Harper of Canada in Press Availability
(Mar. 31, 2006) (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/print/20060331-
4.html).
62. Jerome R. Corsi, Bush Administration Fast-Tracks Formation of North American
Union HUMANEVENTS.coM, Nov. 2006, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?
id=15954.
63. MEMBERS OF THE U.S. SECTION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
COUNCIL 1, available at http://www.counciloftheamericas.org/coa/NACC/NACC%
20Members%20Updated.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
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Canada, Suncor Energy, Canadian National Railroad Company, Bell Ca-
nada Enterprises (BCE), Home Depot Canada, and Scotiabank. 64
One commentary with respect to the formation of the NACC is of par-
ticular interest given that it was authored by one of the scholars, namely
Robert Pastor, who fervently encouraged the creation of such an institu-
tion. Robert Pastor is the co-author of Building a North American Com-
munity: Report of the Independent Task Force on the Future of North
America.65 At a press conference presenting the report, he stated:
The North American summit that occurred in Texas on March 23 is a
very important statement. But if it's to be more than a photo oppor-
tunity, we felt that a second institution was essential, and that would
be a North American advisory council made up of eminent individu-
als, appointed for terms that are longer than those of the govern-
ments, and staggered over time. This council would propose ideas
for dealing with North American challenges, whether they are regu-
latory or transportation or infrastructure or education, and put forth
options to the three leaders to consider ways to adopt a North Amer-
ican approach.66
IV. TRADE AND SECURITY IN THE
CONTEXTS OF MERCOSUR
It is trite to say that there are varying degrees of integration spurned by
a trading relationship. While North American has thus far chosen not to
reach a level of integration to qualify as a customs union, certain South
American countries have. MERCOSUR, made up of Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay, was created with the explicit intention of creating
a common market and a common external tariff, but also provides a plat-
form for member states to discuss common security issues such as drug
trafficking. 67 The relationship between security and trade within the
framework of MERCOSUR dates back to its very origins. One of the
initial purposes of the agreement was to reduce tensions between Argen-
tina and Brazil. Subsequently, according to some scholars, the agreement
helped to avert a possible military coup in Paraguay in 1996 following
reaffirmation by the presidents of the MERCOSUR countries that de-
64. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE, FIRST SSP MINISTERIAL
MEETING WITH THE NORTH AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS COUNCIL 5 (June 15,
2006) available at http://www.counciloftheamericas.org/coa/NACC/NACC5.pdf.
65. JOHN MANLEY, PEDRO ASPE, ROBERT A. PASTOR, & WILLIAM F. WELD, BUILD-
ING A NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT TASK
FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICA (Council on Foreign Relations May
27, 2005) available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8138/building-a-north-ameri-
cancommunity.html.
66. Id.
67. OLI BROWN ET. AL, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: PROMOTING CONFLICT OR
BUILDING PEACE 9 (International Institute for Sustainable Development October
2005), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/security-rta-conflict.pdf#search=%
22%22Trade%20and %20Security%22%20Mercosur%20%22.
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mocracy was a necessary condition for membership. 68 In forming free
trade areas with MERCOSUR, Chile and Bolivia also accepted democ-
racy as a condition for membership. 69
The MERCOSUR countries face security threats of a different charac-
ter, and hence security cooperation among them adopts a different
agenda. These security threats include drug trafficking, money launder-
ing, urban violence and criminality; increasing privatization of security
agencies and a lack of effective control over their operations; an increase
in armed violence related to drug trafficking; problems with corruption in
security and justice institutions; legislative loopholes and lack of opera-
tional mechanisms to enforce compliance. 70 In order to reduce problems
related to armed violence and arms trafficking, the parties to
MERCOSUR have broadly suggested the following lines of action: in-
creasing controls on private security agencies; introducing legislation on
arms controls at the national and regional levels, including regulations on
seizures, stockpiling and destroying excess stocks of arms; and the need
for convergent security policies at the regional level in order to facilitate
information sharing and cooperation. 71
In 2005, the Paraguayan Parliament's granted immunity for the instal-
lation of a U.S. military base in Paraguay. In reaction to that, at a meeting
of the Brazilian Senate,
Workers Party senator Jefferson Peres proposed that, just as the
MERCOSUR countries signed a democratic clause, which pro-
nounces that no dictatorship may be part of the bloc, they should
also approve "another clause stating that third countries [without
naming the U.S.] may not establish permanent bases in any of the
member states, without prior consultation and approval of all mem-
bers" of MERCOSUR. 72
But no action was taken in that direction.
Like the SPP, there is a quest within MERCOSUR to reach accords on
infrastructure works, such as Bolivia's corridor to the sea, that are to the
exclusive benefit of the larger country. A good example is the recent
68. See Presidential Declaration, The Democratic Commitment in MERCOSUR
(June 25, 1996, San Luis, Argentina); see also U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of West-
ern Hemisphere Affairs, Background Note: Paraguay, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/1841.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
69. Ushuaia Protocol on Commitment to Democracy in Mercosur, the Republic of
Bolivia, arts. 1, 3-7, July 24, 1998, http://www.ohchr.org/english/ (select "Issues";
scroll down, select "Democracy"; then "Compilation of documents or texts
adopted..."; scroll down, under "Americas," select the Ushuaia Protocol.
70. LATIN AMERICAN FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, BUILDING A NETWORK FOR
SMALL ARMS CONTROL IN MERCOSUR: WORKSHOP REPORT 2 (International
Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) June 19-20), http://www.iansa.org/re-
gions/samerica/ba-consult.pdf.
71. Id.
72. Razl Zibechi, World Prout Assembly, The Installation of a U.S. Military Base in
Paraguay: A Wedge in Mercosur, AGENCIA LATINOAMERICANA DE INFORMACION
(ALAI), Nov. 29, 2005, http://www.worldproutassembly.org/archives/2005/12/the-
installatio.html (quoting Jefferson Peres, Workers Party Senator).
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commencement of the Inter-Oceanic Highway. This 2,600 kilometre
roadway, which in two years will join the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and
connect three Peruvian ports with the Brazilian port of Santos, is budg-
eted at approximately $1 billion. Brazil will contribute 70 percent of the
cost, but will be its principal beneficiary, because it is increasing its trade
considerably with Asian countries, particularly China.
Unlike the NAFTA, MERCOSUR, from its inception, has been viewed
not only as a means of pursuing trade liberalization and economic inte-
gration, but also as a security instrument. To date, MERCOSUR has fo-
cused attention on issues of counterterrorism (there is a Special Working
Group established for this purpose), border management and law en-
forcement cooperation. Information and intelligence sharing has evolved
into an extensive network, at least on the security side. Less developed
are the military and defense linkages within MERCOSUR, where formal
agreements give way to informal dialogue and communications. 73 Ad-
dressing border security within the context of a customs union is more
fluid than doing so within the context of a regional trading relationship.
At its core, a customs union accepts commonality at its borders.
V. CONCLUSION
The SPP was created in recognition of the reality that in dealing with
any issue of significance, account must be taken of the relationship of that
issue to security. Thus, the question is not whether security trumps trade
but rather, how trade can continue to be facilitated given the new security
paradigm. Security considerations have become an inextricable part of
trade-driven economic integration, as well as of any other endeavour with
potential implications for the safety of the people of North America, and
increasingly of other parts of the world. By taking further continental
integration out of the trade context, and placing it in the security context,
integrationists have changed the debate, and, given the lack of attention
paid to the SPP by the traditional critics of further integration, the draft-
ers have done so in a manner by which the critics have been silenced.
The events of September 11, 2001 altered the ways in which we conduct
our political, business and even personal affairs. But above all, these
events challenged our outlooks, perceptions, and values. They trans-
formed the normative framework in which we had come to view our
world, and the manner by which we endeavour to resolve the problems
we face today. Security is now an ineluctable part of our twenty-first cen-
tury framework, an indispensable element of the solution-seeking
process.
73. Policy Paper, Juan Pablo Soriano & Donald R. Mackay, FOCAL: Canadian Foun-
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